EU enlargement is back at the centre of European politics — driven partly by genuine strategic imperative following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, partly by a renewed recognition that the EU’s neighbourhood is more stable when anchored by membership prospects, and partly by the discomfort of watching candidate countries that were promised European futures drift toward alternative geopolitical alignments. But the aspiration to enlarge and the practical path to doing so remain very different things. Here is where each candidate country actually stands, what the obstacles are, and what a realistic timeline looks like.
Ukraine: the most consequential candidacy
Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022, six months after Russia’s full-scale invasion, in a decision that was as much a political statement as a technical assessment. Formal accession negotiations opened in 2024. Ukraine’s progress — on judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, legislative alignment with the EU acquis — has been genuinely impressive given that it is simultaneously fighting a war. The Commission’s progress reports have been more positive than many expected. But the timescales involved are long: the most optimistic scenarios suggest Ukrainian membership could be completed in the mid-2030s, with more cautious assessments pointing to 2040 or beyond. The institutional reforms required to absorb Ukraine’s population, agricultural sector and regional development needs would transform the EU structurally, as explored in our enlargement debate analysis.
Moldova: the smaller candidate with real momentum
Moldova, which also received candidate status in 2022, has arguably made more rapid measurable progress than Ukraine — partly because it is smaller, and partly because it has not been fighting a war. The ruling Party of Action and Solidarity has pushed through a reform agenda that has impressed Commission evaluators. The unresolved conflict in the Transnistria region — a Russian-backed separatist territory occupying a strip of eastern Moldova — complicates the path but is not considered an absolute barrier to accession if a modus vivendi can be established.
The Western Balkans: the forgotten queue
Montenegro and Serbia opened accession negotiations in 2012 and 2014 respectively — fourteen and twelve years ago. Neither has closed a chapter in years. Montenegro’s rule-of-law track record and political instability have stalled its process. Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions on Russia, and its contested relationship with Kosovo, have effectively frozen its negotiations. Albania and North Macedonia opened negotiations in 2022 after years of delay, and are making genuine progress but at an early stage. Bosnia and Herzegovina received candidate status in 2022 but faces the most complex institutional situation — a constitutional structure that systematically produces gridlock. Kosovo’s aspirations are complicated by non-recognition from five EU member states.
As examined in our Western Balkans analysis, the credibility of the membership promise is the EU’s primary tool for maintaining democratic and pro-European governance in these countries. Years of disappointed expectations have eroded that credibility significantly.
Georgia: the newest candidate, the most contested
Georgia received EU candidate status in 2023, but the relationship has since deteriorated sharply. The Georgian Dream government’s adoption of a foreign agents law modelled on Russian legislation, and its increasingly close alignment with Moscow on foreign policy, led the Commission to suspend the accession process. Georgia remains a candidate on paper; whether the process will resume depends on a change in government direction that has not materialised.
