Nearly four and a half years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, the war in Ukraine remains the defining event reshaping European politics, defence spending and foreign policy. This week, as EU foreign ministers gather in Brussels for a scheduled review of the bloc’s Ukraine support package, the question is no longer whether Europe will stand with Kyiv — it is whether it can sustain the commitment at the scale the situation demands.
The military picture
Ukraine continues to hold significant portions of its internationally recognised territory, though the front line has remained broadly static through much of the first half of 2026. Russian forces have made incremental advances in the east, but at costs — in equipment and manpower — that Western intelligence assessments describe as strategically unsustainable over a multi-year horizon. Ukrainian air defences, bolstered by multiple tranches of Patriot systems and European SHORAD contributions, have significantly reduced Russian ability to conduct sustained deep strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.
The critical variable is ammunition. European defence industries, operating under expanded production contracts signed in 2024 and 2025, are now delivering artillery shells at roughly twice the rate of two years ago — but Ukrainian consumption still outpaces supply during periods of intense combat. The EU’s joint procurement mechanism, launched with considerable fanfare in 2023, has delivered results below initial targets, reflecting the structural limits of European defence industrial capacity. As covered in our recent analysis of Baltic security and Poland’s evolving role, eastern flank NATO members have pushed hardest for accelerating this production ramp-up.
The economic dimension
Ukraine’s economy has shown unexpected resilience, with GDP growth returning to positive territory in 2025 and reconstruction activity in western regions providing a genuine economic stimulus. The EU has channelled approximately €65 billion in financial assistance to Kyiv since 2022, including loans, grants and macro-financial assistance. The International Monetary Fund has maintained its programme, providing a crucial signal to private creditors that Ukraine’s fiscal position remains viable.
For European economies, the war’s costs are direct and ongoing. Energy prices, though eased from their 2022 crisis peaks, remain elevated — a structural consequence of Europe’s abrupt exit from Russian gas dependency that affects household budgets and industrial competitiveness simultaneously.
The political dimension
Support for Ukraine within the EU remains broad but is not uniform. Hungary continues to block certain bilateral measures, though its ability to obstruct EU-level decisions has been progressively constrained by coalition-building among the remaining 26 member states. Public support for Ukraine assistance in Western Europe, while still majority positive, has softened slightly from its 2022 peak as the conflict’s duration tests public patience.
The most consequential political variable remains Washington. European capitals have accelerated planning for scenarios in which American commitment to Ukrainian support varies — a conversation that would have been unthinkable in 2022 but is now a standard element of European defence planning.
Where things go from here
No credible path to a negotiated settlement is visible this week. Russia has shown no willingness to accept terms that Ukraine — or its European backers — would consider acceptable, and Ukraine has consistently stated that territorial concessions are off the table. The most likely near-term trajectory is continuation: sustained Western support, ongoing combat at variable intensity, and a political resolution whose timeline remains genuinely uncertain. For Europe, that means learning to treat this not as a crisis but as a structural condition — and adjusting defence spending, industrial policy and foreign policy accordingly.
