Europe’s relationship with the Middle East has never been simple. It is a region that supplies energy, generates migration flows, tests diplomatic frameworks and, periodically, exports instability in ways that land directly on EU soil. In the summer of 2026, with conflicts ongoing, energy markets still adjusting to post-2022 realities, and Mediterranean migration routes as active as ever, the relationship between these two neighbouring regions demands careful examination.
Energy: the dependency that reshaped itself
The rupture with Russian energy supplies after 2022 pushed Europe to diversify urgently — and the Middle East was a primary beneficiary. Qatar expanded its LNG export contracts with Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Saudi Arabia and the UAE increased crude oil flows to European refineries. Israeli offshore gas production, feeding into pipelines reaching southern Europe via Greece and Italy, has grown from a niche supply to a meaningful component of the European energy mix.
This shift has consequences. Europe’s energy diplomacy now runs through Doha, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in ways it did not before 2022. That gives Gulf states leverage — and they have not been reluctant to use it. The complex dance between EU climate commitments, which aim to reduce fossil fuel consumption dramatically by 2035, and the political necessity of maintaining energy relationships with major hydrocarbon producers creates a structural tension that European capitals are still working through.
The transition is visible in infrastructure. New LNG import terminals have come online in Germany, Finland and Estonia. Undersea pipelines and electricity interconnectors linking North Africa to southern Europe are under development, though their political dimensions — involving Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia — add layers of complexity that purely technical assessments underestimate.
Migration: a permanent policy challenge
The central Mediterranean route — from Libya and Tunisia to Italy, Malta and Greece — has remained persistently active. Arrivals in Italy in the first half of 2026 are running at approximately 65,000, slightly below the same period in 2023 but well above the 2017–2021 average. The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, agreed with difficulty in 2024, is now in its implementation phase — but its practical effect on arrival numbers has so far been limited.
EU diplomacy with transit countries has intensified. The Commission has signed “comprehensive partnerships” with Tunisia and Egypt, combining development funding, trade access and cooperation on border management. Critics, including human rights organisations and some MEPs, argue these deals effectively outsource border enforcement to governments with poor human rights records, trading short-term migration reduction for long-term reputational costs.
Diplomacy: Europe’s limited leverage
The ongoing conflict in Gaza has strained EU foreign policy cohesion in ways that echo the difficulties examined in our coverage of German coalition tensions and the broader debate about European strategic voice. Member states have taken divergent positions on the conflict, ranging from strong Israeli solidarity to calls for immediate ceasefires — making a common EU position impossible to sustain beyond vague declarations.
This inability to speak with a single voice on Middle Eastern affairs — a recurring EU failure — reduces European diplomatic leverage precisely when the region’s instability most directly affects European interests. Energy security, migration management and counter-terrorism cooperation all depend on functioning relationships with Middle Eastern governments whose behaviour Europe simultaneously criticises. It is a contradiction the EU has not yet resolved, and shows little sign of resolving soon.
